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Law and Religion in American Education  




This Article analyzes the major United States Supreme Court cases on the 
role of religion in public schools, the role of government in religious schools, and 
the place of religious rights of students and parents in all schools.  It shows how 
the Court’s religion cases have vacillated between principles of strict separation 
of church and state and accommodation and equal treatment of religion.  It 
shows how the Court has slowly come to protect and enhance the freedom of 
parents and students to choose between public and private education.  And it 
shows how the Court has long protected students from being coerced to 
participate in religion or to abandon their religious practices.  
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Introduction 
While American schools are governed by sundry federal, state, and local 
laws, the most important law on religion and education is the First Amendment 
guarantee: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Of the United States Supreme Court’s 
200 plus cases on religious freedom, fully 60 cases have been on issues of 
religion and education – most of them announced after 1940, the year the Court 
began to apply the First Amendment to state and local governments alongside 
“Congress.”   
These cases address three main questions: (1) What role may religion 
play in public school education?  (2) What role may government play in private 
religious education?  and (3) What religious rights do parents and students have 
in public and private schools?  The Court has worked out a set of rough answers 
to these questions, which lower courts have continued to refine and extend. 
While government has the power to mandate education for all children, parents 
have the right to choose public, private, or home school education for their minor 
children, and government may now facilitate that choice through vouchers and 
tax relief.  While the First Amendment forbids most forms of religion in public 
schools, it protects most forms of religion in private schools.  While the First 
Amendment forbids government from funding the core religious activities of 
private schools, it permits delivery of general governmental services and 
subsidies to public and private schools and students alike. While the First 
Amendment forbids public school teachers and outsiders from religious 
instruction and expression in classes and formal school functions, it permits 
public school students to engage in private religious expression and protects 
these students from coerced religious activities. It further requires that religious 
students and other private parties get equal access to public school facilities, 
forums, and even funds that are open to their non-religious peers for non-school 
functions.   
Religion and Public Education 
Separation of Church and State.  In a forty-year series of cases 
beginning in the 1940s, the Court developed a general argument about the 
limited place of religion in public schools.  The public school is a government 
entity, the Court argued, one of the most visible and well-known arms of the 
government in any community.  The public school is furthermore a model of 
constitutional democracy and designed to communicate core democratic norms 
and constitutional practices to students.  The state mandates that all able 
students attend schools, at least until the age of sixteen. These students are 
young and impressionable.  Given all these factors, the public school must cling 
closely to core constitutional and democratic values, including the core value of 
separation of church and state. Some relaxation of constitutional values is 
possible in other public contexts, where adults can make informed assessments 
of the values being transmitted.  But no such relaxation can occur in public 
schools with their impressionable youths who are compelled to be there.  In 
public schools, if nowhere else in public life, strict separation of church and state 
must be the norm.  
The case that opened this series was McCollum v. Board of Education 
(1948).  At issue was a “release time” program, adopted by a local public school 
board for fourth through ninth grade students.  Once a week, students were 
released from their regular classes to be able to participate in a religious class 
taught at the public school.  Three religious classes were on offer -- Protestant, 
Catholic, or Jewish – reflecting the religious makeup of the local community.  
These classes were voluntarily taught by qualified outside teachers, approved by 
the principal.  Students whose parents did not consent continued their “secular 
studies” during this release time period.  A parent challenged the program as a 
violation of the First Amendment establishment clause. The McCollum Court 
agreed, finding that this program constituted the use of “tax-supported property 
for religious instruction and the close cooperation between school authorities and 
the religious council in promoting religious education.” 
The operation of the State’s compulsory education 
system thus assists and is integrated with the program 
of religious instruction carried on by separate religious 
sects…. This is beyond all question a utilization of the 
tax-established and tax-supported public school to aid 
religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls 
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment [that] 
… erected a wall of separation between Church and 
State. 
In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Court extended this reasoning to outlaw 
prayer in public schools. The New York State Board of Regents had adopted a 
nondenominational prayer to be recited by public school teachers and their 
students at the commencement of each school day: “Almighty God, we 
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, 
our parents, our teachers, and our Country.”  Students who did not wish to pray 
could remain silent or be excused from the room during its recitation.  Parents 
challenged the practice as a violation of the establishment clause.  The Engel 
Court agreed and struck down the practice: 
It is no part of the business of government to compose 
official prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as part of a religious program carried on by 
government.... Neither the fact that the prayer may be 
denominationally neutral nor the fact that its 
observance on the part of the students is voluntary can 
serve to free it from the Establishment Clause.... When 
the power, prestige, and financial support of 
government [are] placed behind a particular religious 
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially 
approved religion is plain. 
This prohibition on prayer in public schools has remained good law.  In the 
controversial case of Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), the Court struck down a state 
statute that authorized even a moment of silence at the beginning of each school 
day for “meditation or voluntary prayer,” because the legislature had betrayed its 
“intent to return prayer to the public schools.”  Lee v. Weisman (1992) outlawed a 
local rabbi’s prayer at a one-time public middle school graduation, arguing that 
such prayers effectively coerced students to participate in religion.  And Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe (2000) outlawed elected student-led prayers 
at the start of each public school football game, arguing that this policy not only 
coerced students but constituted governmental endorsement of religion. 
In Abington Township School District v. Schempp (1963), the Court 
outlawed the reading of ten Bible verses at the beginning of each public school 
day. Either a teacher or a volunteer student would read a text of their choice, with 
no commentary or discussion allowed. Students whose parents did not consent 
could refuse to listen or leave the room.  After Engel, the Schempp Court found 
this an easy case.  The policy in question was an overtly religious exercise, 
mandated by the state, for impressionable youths required to be in school, with 
no realistic opportunity for the average young student to forgo participation. “[I]t is 
no defense that the religious practices here may be relatively minor 
encroachments on the First Amendment,” Justice Clark wrote for the Court. “The 
breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a 
raging torrent.”   
In Stone v. Graham (1980), the Court further struck down a state statute 
that allowed private group to donate and hang the Ten Commandments in public 
high school classrooms. There was no public reading of the commandments or 
endorsement of them by teachers or school officials.  Each plaque described the 
Ten Commandments “as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and 
the Common Law of the United States.” The Stone Court found the Decalogue to 
be a “clearly religious” text no matter how it was labeled, and that its display 
improperly commanded students to abide by “religious duties.”   
Finally, in Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), the Court struck down a state law 
that required public school teachers to give equal time to “evolution-science” and 
“creation-science” in their science classrooms.  The Court held that the statute 
evinced a “discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation and against the 
teaching of evolution.”  It aimed “to advance the religious viewpoint that a 
supernatural being created humankind” and “to restructure the science 
curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint.”  This was not a 
proper objective teaching of religion but an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion.  Lower courts have used this precedent to outlaw “intelligent design” 
teachings from public school curricula as well.   
Liberty of Conscience.  While separation of church and state was the 
major key played in the Court’s early orchestrations on religion and public 
schools, liberty of conscience and freedom of religious exercise was a minor key 
that periodically sounded as well.  West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette (1943) was a case in point.  There Jehovah’s Witness children were 
expelled from a public school because they refused to salute the American flag 
or recite the pledge of allegiance – important patriotic acts in the middle of World 
War II. The Witnesses regarded such acts as idolatrous, and viewed their 
imposition as a violation of liberty of conscience. The Barnette Court agreed.  
While acknowledging the importance of teaching national loyalty and unity in 
public schools, the Barnette Court held that the Witnesses should be 
conscientiously exempted from participating:  
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us. 
In Zorach v. Clauson (1952), the Court further allowed students to be 
released from public school, at their parents’ request, to attend important 
religious functions scheduled during school time.  These functions were off 
school grounds and involved no school officials or expenses. Taxpayers objected 
that this program violated the establishment clause and its principle of strict 
separation of church and state. The Zorach Court disagreed. “We would have to 
press the concept of separation of Church and State to ... extremes to condemn 
the present law on constitutional grounds.”  But this is neither constitutionally 
necessary nor desirable.  “When the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to 
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.”   
Modern Equal Access Cases.  While official prayers and overt forms of 
religious expression remain prohibited in public schools, private religious 
expression by public school students and others, outside of formal school hours, 
has come to be constitutionally protected.  The Supreme Court has reached this 
conclusion in a series of cases that have often pitted the principles of religious 
equality and non-discrimination against that of separation of church and state.  
The opening case in this series was Widmar v. Vincent (1981).  The state 
University of Missouri had a policy of opening its facilities to voluntary student 
groups to use outside of formal instructional time.  More than 100 student groups 
organized themselves in the year at issue.  A voluntary student group, organized 
for private religious devotion and charity, sought access to the university 
facilities. The group was denied access, in application of the university’s written 
policy that the campus could not be used “for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching.” The student group appealed, arguing that this policy violated 
their First Amendment free exercise and free speech rights as well as their 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The university countered that it 
had a compelling state interest to maintain a “strict separation of church and 
state.” 
The Widmar Court found for the religious student group. The Court held 
that where a state university creates a limited public forum open to voluntary 
student groups, religious groups must be given “equal access” to that forum.  
Here the university “has discriminated against student groups and speakers 
based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious 
worship and discussion.”  Religious speech and association are protected by the 
First Amendment and can be excluded only if the university can demonstrate that 
its statute serves a “compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.” In the Court’s view, a general desire to keep a strict separation 
of church and state was not a sufficiently compelling state interest. The values of 
“equal treatment and access” outweighed the hypothetical dangers of a religious 
establishment.  Three years later, Congress extended this equal access right to 
after-school voluntary meetings of public high school students as well.  In 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens (1990), the Court upheld that law 
against an establishment clause challenge, arguing that Congress had 
legitimately protected the rights of religious students to “equal treatment” and 
“equal protection.” 
In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District (1993), 
the Court extended the “equal access” principle to other religious groups besides 
students.  A local school board opened its public school facilities after hours to 
local private groups for various “social, civic, recreational, and political uses.” A 
state policy, however, provided that the “school premises shall not be used by 
any group for religious purposes.”  Lamb’s Chapel, an evangelical group, wanted 
to use the facilities to show a film series that discussed traditional family values 
from a Christian perspective. When their application was twice denied, they filed 
suit arguing that such exclusion violated their free speech rights. The Lamb’s 
Chapel Court agreed. Relying on Widmar, the Court found that the school had 
engaged in religious discrimination, and that its concern to avoid an 
establishment of religion was not a sufficient reason for denying equal access to 
this religious group. 
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (1995), 
the Court extended this equal access logic to hold that a voluntary group of 
religious students in a state university was entitled to the same funding made 
available to nonreligious student groups to publish their materials.  The University 
of Virginia had denied funds to a properly-registered religious student group that 
printed an overtly religious newspaper for circulation on campus.  The group 
appealed, arguing that such discriminatory treatment violated their First 
Amendment free speech rights. The Rosenberger Court agreed. The state 
university policy, the Court opined, improperly “selects for disfavored treatment 
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.” This was 
unconstitutional “viewpoint discrimination.”  
In its last case in this series, Good News Club v. Milford Central School 
(2001), the Court extended the equal access logic to the public grade school.  
Authorized by a state statute, a local school board invited qualified local residents 
to use public school facilities after school hours for "instruction in any branch of 
education, learning, or the arts" and for "social, civic and recreational meetings." 
The policy, however, prohibited use of the facilities “for religious purposes.” Good 
News Club, a private Christian organization that instructed 6-12 year old students 
in Christian morality and practice, sought permission to hold the club's weekly 
after-school meetings in the public school cafeteria for children who attended that 
school. Their lesson plans involved adult-led prayers, religious songs, and 
student recitation of Bible verses, among other activities.  Denied permission, 
they appealed, arguing that the policy was discriminatory against religion.  
The Good News Court agreed, arguing that, even in a public grade school, 
the state “must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint.” The 
school district was not obliged to create this "limited public forum," but once it did, 
any restriction had to be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the forum's 
purpose.  The Good News Club’s program clearly included "instruction in any 
branch of education, learning, or the arts," and it could not be excluded just 
because the instruction came “from a religious viewpoint.”  
The upshot of all these Supreme Court cases is that religious teachers, 
texts, ceremonies, and symbols are prohibited from the public school classroom 
during instructional time, and even at one-time official public school gatherings.  
But private religious expression by students, parents, community members, and 
even teachers is permissible on public school grounds before and after classes 
or on days when school is not in session. Students, however, may not be 
coerced into participation in any religious activities, whether during or after 
school.  Lower courts and regulations have further insisted that students may not, 
in turn, be coerced to abandon their religious practices, such as wearing religious 
apparel or ornamentation, abiding by their religious diet, praying before meals, or 
observing their sabbaths and holy days. Lower courts have also made clear that 
public schools may teach objective facts about religion in appropriate courses: an 
ancient literature course can include a few Psalms; an American history course 
can discuss the beliefs of the Mayflower Pilgrims.  
Government and Religious Education 
In another long series of cases, this one beginning already in the 1920s, 
the Supreme Court developed a general argument about the role of government 
in private religious schools.  Private schools of all sorts, the Court repeatedly 
held, are viable and valuable alternatives to public schools. Private religious 
schools in particular allow parents to educate their students in their own religious 
tradition, a right which they must enjoy without discrimination or prejudice.  Given 
that public education must be secular under the establishment clause, private 
education may be religious under the free exercise clause.  To be accredited, all 
private schools must meet minimum educational standards.  They must teach 
reading, writing, and arithmetic, history, geography, social studies, and the like so 
that their graduates are not culturally or intellectually handicapped. But these 
private schools may teach these subjects from a religious perspective and add 
religious instruction and activities beyond them. They may discriminate in favor of 
hiring teachers that share their faith, and must be free from some of the usual 
requirements of teachers’ unions.  And these religious schools are presumptively 
entitled to the same government services that are made available to their 
counterparts in public schools -- so long as those services are not used for core 
religious activities.  The Supreme Court followed this accommodationist logic 
from 1925 to 1971, abruptly reversed course in favor of strict separationism from 
1971 to 1986, and since then has returned to a new variant of 
accommodationism, framed in “equal access” terms.   
Accommodation of Religious Education.  The most important early 
religious school case was Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).  Oregon had 
passed a law mandating that all eligible students must attend public schools. The 
law sought to eliminate Catholic and other private religious schools and to give 
new impetus to the development of the state’s public schools.  Local private 
Catholic schools challenged this as a violation of the educational rights of the 
parents, children, schools, and school teachers alike. The Pierce Court agreed 
and struck down the Oregon law.  “The fundamental theory of liberty,” the Court 
opined, “excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”  It also forecloses 
“unwarranted compulsion” of “present and future patrons” of the religious 
schools. Extending Pierce, Farrington v. Tokushige (1927) held that states could 
not impose unduly intrusive and stringent accreditation and regulatory 
requirements on religious and other private schools. And Cochran v. Board of 
Education (1930) upheld a state policy of supplying textbooks to all students, 
including religious school students. 
This accommodation of religious schools and students continued into the 
early 1970s.  Everson v. Board of Education (1947), though peppered with 
sweeping dicta on the wall of separation between church and state, still held that 
states could provide school bus transportation to religious and public school 
children alike and reimburse the parents of religious and public school children 
alike for the costs of using school bus transportation. “[C]utting off church schools 
[and their students] from these services, so separate and indisputably marked off 
from the religious function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to 
operate,” the Court opined.  “But such obviously is not the purpose of the First 
Amendment. The Amendment requires the State to be neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be 
their adversary.” 
The Court struck a similar tone in Board of Education v. Allen (1968). The 
State of New York had a policy of lending prescribed textbooks in science, 
mathematics, and other “secular subjects” to all students in the state, whether 
attending public or private schools. Many of the private school recipients of the 
textbooks were religious schools.  A taxpayer challenged the policy as a violation 
of the establishment clause. Citing Cochran, the Allen Court rejected this claim, 
emphasizing that it was the students and parents, not the religious schools, who 
directly benefited. “Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children 
choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fares 
in Everson, and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of 
support for a religious institution.”  
The Court opined similarly in Tilton v. Richardson (1971), which upheld 
the use of federal funds for the construction of library, science, and arts buildings 
at church-related colleges among many other secular colleges and universities.  
Since these “federally-subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and 
not the religious functions of the recipient institution,” and since both religious 
and secular schools are equally eligible for these funds, there was no violation of 
the establishment clause, the Tilton Court concluded.   
The Court went even further in accommodating religious education in the 
1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.  Wisconsin, like all states, mandated that able 
children attend school until the age of sixteen.  A community of Old Order Amish, 
who were dedicated to a simple agrarian life style based on biblical principles, 
conceded the need to send their children to grade school – to teach them the 
basic fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic that they would need.  But 
the community leaders and parents refused to send their children to higher 
schools, lest they be tempted by worldly concerns and distracted from learning 
the values and skills they would need to maintain the Amish lifestyle.  After they 
were fined for disobeying school attendance laws, the parents and community 
leaders filed suit, arguing that the State had violated their free exercise and 
parental rights.  The Yoder Court agreed, and ordered that they be exempted 
from full compliance with these laws.  The Court was impressed that the Amish 
“lifestyle” was centuries-old and “not merely a matter of personal preference, but 
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living.” In the Court’s view, compliance with the compulsory 
school attendance law would pose “a very real threat of undermining the Amish 
community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon 
belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some 
other and more tolerant region.” To exempt them was not to “establish the Amish 
religion” but to “accommodate their free exercise rights.” This case would later 
become a locus classicus for the home schooling options, which lower federal 
and state courts have upheld in a number of states.  
Separation of Church and State.  In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the 
Supreme Court abruptly reversed course.  Drawing on the strict separationist 
logic of its earlier public school cases, the Lemon Court crafted a three-part test 
to be used in all future cases arising under the First Amendment establishment 
clause, including those dealing with religious schools. To meet constitutional 
objections, the Court held, any challenged government law must: 1) have a 
secular purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and (3) not foster an excessive entanglement between church and state.  
The Lemon Court used this three-part test to strike down a state policy 
that reimbursed Catholic and religious schools for some of the costs of teaching 
secular subjects that the state prescribed. The state policy was restricted to 
religious schools that served students from lower-income families and the 
reimbursements were limited to 15 percent of the costs. The Lemon Court held 
that this policy fostered an “excessive entanglement between church and state.” 
The Catholic schools, in question, were notably religious, the Court held—closely 
allied with nearby parish churches, filled with religious symbols, and staffed 
primarily by nuns who were under “religious control and discipline.” “[A] dedicated 
religious person, teaching at a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated 
to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining 
religiously neutral.” She will be tempted to teach secular subjects with a religious 
orientation in violation of state policy. “A comprehensive, discriminating, and 
continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these 
restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise obeyed.” This is 
precisely the kind of excessive entanglement between church and state that the 
First Amendment establishment clause outlaws. 
Lemon left open the question whether the state could give aid directly to 
religious students or to their parents—as the Court had allowed in earlier cases. 
Two years later, the Court closed this door tightly. In Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist (1973) and Sloan v. Lemon (1973), the Court struck down 
state policies that allowed low-income parents to seek reimbursements from the 
state for some of the costs of religious school tuition. Nyquist further struck down 
a state policy that allowed low-income parents to take tax deductions for the 
costs of sending their children to private schools. In Nyquist, Justice Powell 
characterized such policies as just another “of the ingenious plans of channeling 
state aid to sectarian schools.” Responding to the state argument that “grants to 
parents, unlike grants to [religious] institutions, respect the ‘wall of separation’ 
required by the Constitution,” the Court declared that “the [primary] effect of the 
aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for non-public, sectarian 
institutions.” 
Lemon also left open the question of whether the state could give 
textbooks, educational materials, or other aid to religious schools for the teaching 
of mandatory secular subjects, or the administration of state-mandated tests and 
other programs. The Court struck down most such policies in a long series cases 
from 1973 to 1985.  These cases, and their ample extension by lower courts, 
created a high wall of separation between public and private school facilities, 
funds, teachers, students, and programs.  Aguilar v. Felton (1985) is a good 
example of how strict the separation had become. Aguilar concerned the 
remedial educational services that were authorized and funded by Congress in 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), known as the Title I 
program. The act set detailed standards both for student eligibility and for the 
nature of the education to be offered eligible students. More than 20,000 religious 
school students in the city annually availed themselves of these Title I services, 
alongside tens of thousands of public school students.  Lacking sufficient space 
in existing public buildings, and lacking sufficient land to build new public 
buildings adjacent to religious schools, the city offered the remedial services on 
site to eligible religious school students. State-funded public school teachers with 
materials were sent into the religious schools to teach the eligible religious school 
students. Field supervisors were sent out monthly to ensure that the Title I funds 
were directed to remedial, not religious, education in these schools. The program 
had been in place for nineteen years without challenge. 
Local taxpayers, however, then challenged the program as a violation of 
the establishment clause.  The Aguilar Court agreed. Though “well-intentioned,” 
the Court opined, the program fosters an excessive entanglement of church and 
state. The religious schools receiving the Title I instructors are “pervasively 
sectarian,” having as a “substantial purpose, the inculcation of religious values.” 
Because of this, “ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a 
religious message. In short, the scope and duration of New York’s Title I program 
would require a permanent and pervasive State presence in the sectarian 
schools receiving aid.” This is precisely the kind of excessive entanglement 
between church and state that the disestablishment clause outlaws. 
Equal Treatment and Freedom of Choice.  This strict separation 
between public and private schools, however alluring and simple in theory, 
ultimately proved unworkable in practice, with Aguilar an unpopular case in point.  
Accordingly, in the mid-1980s forward, the Supreme Court moved back toward 
greater accommodation and government support of religious education, and 
eventually reversed Aguilar and two other strict separationist cases from the 
1970s.   
The first case in this new series was Mueller v. Allen (1983).  There the 
Court upheld a Minnesota law that allowed parents of private school children to 
claim tax deductions from state income tax for the costs of “tuition, transportation, 
and textbooks.” Ninety-five percent of the private school children in the state 
attended religious schools. Most of their parents availed themselves of this tax 
deduction. A taxpayer in the state challenged the law as an establishment of 
religion.  The Mueller Court disagreed. The tax deduction policy had a secular 
purpose of fostering quality education, fostered no entanglement between church 
and state, and had the primary effect of enhancing the educational choices of 
parents and students.  The state aid to sectarian schools “becomes available 
only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age 
children.” This saves it from constitutional infirmity.  Several later cases, most 
recently, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2011), have 
upheld such state tax deduction, exemption, and credit programs that help 
parents pay for religious schools, even while they are taxed to support public 
schools.  
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986), the 
Court upheld a state program that furnished aid to a student attending a Christian 
college.  The program provided funds “for special education and/or training in the 
professions, business or trades” for the visually impaired. Money was to be paid 
directly to eligible recipients, who were entitled to pursue education in the 
professional schools of their choice. Mr. Witters’s condition qualified him for the 
funds. His profession of choice was the Christian ministry. He sought funds to 
attend a Christian college in preparation for the same. The state agency denied 
funding on grounds that this was direct funding of religious education.  The 
Witters Court disagreed.  The policy served a secular purpose of fostering 
educational and professional choice for all, including the handicapped. It involved 
no entanglement of church and state. Its primary effect was to facilitate this 
student’s professional education, which happened to be religious.  This “is not 
one of ‘the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools’,” the 
Court opined. “It creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian 
education. It does not provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who 
apply their aid to religious education.... In this case, the fact that aid goes to 
individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the 
individual not by the State.” 
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993), the Court extended 
this logic from a college student to a high school student. Both federal and state 
disability acts required that a hearing-impaired student be furnished with a sign-
language interpreter to accompany him or her to classes. The state paid for the 
interpreter.  Mr. Zobrest’s hearing impairment qualified him for an interpreter’s 
services. But after going to a public grade school, he enrolled at a Catholic high 
school. The state refused to furnish him with an interpreter, on grounds that this 
would violate the Lemon rule that the state could give no direct aid to a religious 
school; moreover, the presence of a state-employed interpreter in a Catholic high 
school would foster an excessive entanglement between church and state.  
Following Mueller and Witters, the Zobrest Court upheld the act as “a neutral 
government program dispensing aid not to schools but to handicapped children.”  
In Agostini v. Felton (1997), the Court extended this logic from the high 
school to the grade school. It reversed Aguilar v. Felton and reinstated the Title I 
services to public and private elementary and high school students alike.  
Children in religious schools, the Court held, are just as entitled to Title I benefits 
as children in public schools. They cannot be denied these benefits simply for the 
sake of upholding “the abstract principle” of separation of church and state. 
In Mitchell v. Helms (2000), the Court upheld the constitutionality of direct 
government aid to the secular functions of religious schools.  The federal 
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (1981) channeled federal funds to 
state and local education agencies for the purchase of various educational 
materials and equipment.  The Act permitted states to loan such materials 
directly to public and private elementary and secondary schools, provided that 
the state retained title in those materials and that the recipient schools used them 
only for programs that are "secular, neutral, and nonideological."  The amount of 
material aid for each participating school depended on the number of students it 
matriculated. Using the statutory formula, Louisiana distributed materials and 
equipment to public and private schools in the state.  In one county, some 30 
percent of the federal aid was allocated to private schools, most of which were 
Catholic. The aid was distributed properly and the materials and equipment were 
used only for "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs in each religious 
school.  Local taxpayers brought suit, however, arguing that such “direct aid” to 
such “pervasively sectarian” schools constituted an establishment of religion.   
The Mitchell Court disagreed, and held the program constitutional both on 
its face and as applied in this case.  The federal act did not advance religion, nor 
did its define its recipients by reference to religion; all accredited public and 
private schools and students were eligible.  And there was no excessive 
entanglement between religious and governmental officials in the administration 
of the program.  Accordingly, the Court upheld the law, and overruled two earlier 
cases – Meek v. Pittenger (1975) and Wolman v. Walter (1977) – that had struck 
down similar aid programs distributing materials directly to religious schools.  The 
separationist principles at work in these two decisions had become unworkably 
rigid, the Mitchell Court concluded. 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the Court further upheld a school 
voucher program that Ohio had adopted to address a “crisis of magnitude” in its 
Cleveland public school system.  The program gave parents a choice to leave 
their children in the local Cleveland public school district or to enroll them in 
another public or private school that participated in the school voucher program. 
For those parents who chose to send their children to a participating private 
school, the program provided them with a voucher to help defray tuition costs, 
though parents had to make copayments according to their means.  Some 82% 
of the private schools participating in the voucher program were religiously 
affiliated; 96% of the students who used vouchers enrolled in these private 
religious schools.  Taxpayers challenged the program as a violation of the 
establishment clause.  The Zelman Court disagreed.  For the Court, there was no 
dispute that the program was enacted for a “valid secular purpose of providing 
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school 
system.”  The primary effect of the program was not to advance religion but to 
enhance educational choice for poor students and parents.  “Where a 
government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides 
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens, who, in turn, direct government 
aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent 
private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the 
Establishment Clause.  A program that shares these features permits 
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate 
choices of numerous individual recipients.  The incidental advancement of a 
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message is 
reasonably attributable to the individual, not the government, whose role ends 
with the disbursement of the funds.”  Several lower courts have used Zelman to 
uphold school voucher programs in other states.  
Conclusions  
 
These First Amendment cases on religion and education have not always 
followed clean logical lines. The Supreme Court has sometimes digressed and 
occasionally reversed itself.  Several of the Court’s religion and education cases 
have featured brilliant rhetorical and judicial fireworks in majority and dissenting 
opinions as the Court has occasionally shifted into a new understanding of the 
demands of the First Amendment.  Part of this back-and-forth is typical of any 
constitutional law in action.  “Constitutions work like clocks,” American founder 
John Adams once put it.  To function properly, their pendulums must swing back 
and forth, and their mechanisms and operators must get “wound up from time to 
time.”   
 
The Court’s cases on religion and public education swung from logics of 
strict separationism to equal access.  The controversial 1985 Wallace v. Jaffree 
case, outlawing even private moments of silence in public schools, was the likely 
tipping point.  The 2001 Good News Club case, authorizing a public grade school 
extracurricular program heavy on religion, might well become the stopping point 
to this equal access logic. The Court’s cases on government in religious 
education cases, in turn, swung from accommodation to separation to equal 
treatment.  The controversial 1985 Aguilar case that cut 20,000 religious students 
from remedial education helped catalyze the emergence of equal treatment 
cases.  The controversial 2002 Zelman voucher case that allowed state money to 
be used even for “sectarian education” might well become the stopping point for 
this new accommodation.  Given the centrality of both religion and education in 
American life, it is inevitable that constitutional litigation will continue apace.   
 
One trend to watch, however, is the current Supreme Court’s growing 
appetite for federalism, and its growing deference to state and local law-making 
on many fronts, including on education.  It is unlikely that this Court will follow the 
call of some originalists to apply the First Amendment religion clauses literally 
only to “Congress” rather than to all levels of government.  But it is likely that the 
Court will continue to soften the standards of scrutiny in establishment and free 
exercise cases, leaving local and state governments with more latitude to 
construct new religion and educational policies without interference from the 
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